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NATO Watch Observatory is a Bi-monthly newsletter that focuses on NATO policy and operations, drawing its clips from a wide range of subscriptions, feeds and alerts covering a substantial part of the major English language newspapers and other periodicals worldwide.

NATO Watch News Brief
20 January 2012

NATO Secretary General urges Iran to keep Strait of Hormuz open

Nuclear-sharing with Middle East allies suggested by NATO Defence College paper

Speaking at a joint news conference in Brussels on 18 January with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen urged Iran to keep the Strait of Hormuz open for energy supplies. Turkey offered to host a new round of talks between Iran and the EU.

While stressing that NATO had no plans to intervene in the area – used for a third of the world’s seaborne oil exports – the Secretary-General said it was of “utmost importance to make sure energy supplies continue to flow through the vital waterway”. “I would like to stress that the Iranian authorities have a duty to act as responsible international actors and in accordance with international law,” Mr Rasmussen added.

Mr Davutoglu said he had been in contact with the EU’s Foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, and confirmed Turkey was ready to host a new round of talks between Western powers and Iran over Tehran’s nuclear programme.

“During my visit in Tehran, Iran declared that they are ready to restart the talks. Before that I had consultations with Madame Ashton, she in fact asked me to consult this with the Iranian side as well, and after this I spoke with Madame Ashton again. Both sides declared the intention to meet and to restart the negotiations. Of course it is up to both sides to decide, but as Turkey we will be happy to host these new rounds of talks,” said Mr Davutoglu.

Speaking on a visit to Turkey earlier in the week, Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said negotiations for new talks were under way. The last talks between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council – the US, Britain, France, Russia and China – along with Germany stalled in Istanbul a year ago, with the parties unable to agree even on an agenda.

Meanwhile, as tensions continue to rise in the Persian Gulf, a new paper The day after Iran goes nuclear: Implications for NATO from the NATO Defence College in Rome examines the implications of a nuclear-armed Iran. The author, Jean-Loup Samaan, a researcher and lecturer in the Middle East Department of the College, argues that the biggest challenge both for the region and NATO “the day after Iran goes nuclear” is not the potential for nuclear warfare per se but the risk of increasing sub-conventional confrontations and of “nuclear hedging” among NATO partners in the region. As a result, he concludes that a nuclear Iran represents a major test for NATO: it challenges the raison d’être of its partnerships and raises the need for key decisions on the future of NATO nuclear and missile defence systems.

As one of several potential responses, Samaam suggests that NATO and its Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners should consider adopting ‘extended deterrence’ in the form of ‘nuclear sharing’. “This would not involve the stationing of nuclear weapons on the soil of host countries but it might rely on policy measures such as information sharing, nuclear consultations, common planning and common execution”, he says. An added measure of reassurance to NATO’s Middle Eastern allies could be provided by “a relocation of US nuclear weapons currently stationed in Europe, from northern Europe to southern Europe”.

However, arms control groups contacted by NATO Watch were critical of the proposals on the basis that they risked undermining efforts to avoid a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

Wilbert van der Zeijden, an international relations specialist working for the Nuclear Disarmament team of IKV Pax Christi in Utrecht, the Netherlands, said “Samaan’s suggestion to relocate US nuclear weapons to Southern Europe makes little sense. There already are US nuclear weapons in southern Europe, in Italy and Turkey. And burden sharing with Middle Eastern countries would be solely symbolic and therefore irrelevant to Iran. The suggestion could however feed the Iranian case for going nuclear out of ‘self defence’”. He added, “The paper also raises the question as to which Middle Eastern allies he wants to share nuclear secrets. Saudi Arabia? Qatar? Israel already has a nuclear arsenal unchecked by the NPT. More ‘nuclear deterrence’ in the region is the problem, not a solution”.

Similarly, Paul Ingram, Executive Director of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) in London said, “It is challenging enough for NATO member states to balance a continuing commitment to nuclear deterrence and diplomatic efforts to persuade others with far greater security challenges to foreswear the nuclear option. But if NATO were to ramp up its nuclear threat along the lines proposed it could prove disastrous for regional and global stability”.

Call for Independent ‘Lessons Learnt’ Inquiry into NATO Libyan Campaign

October 28, 2011

NATO Watch calls on the NATO Secretary General to establish an independent inquiry to evaluate Operation Unified Protector in its entirety

NATO will officially end its seven-month operation in Libya on 31 October, its governing North Atlantic Council said in a statement on 21 October. The Alliance secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen speaking at a press conference the same day said, “This is serious business”. “It was serious business to take on the responsibility of this operation in Libya. It is also serious business to take the decision to terminate such an operation because we take full implementation of the United Nations’ mandate very seriously”, he added.

We agree. Such a ‘serious business’ deserves a full, frank and independent evaluation of lessons learnt. In his press conference, for example, Rasmussen claimed that “Our military forces prevented a massacre and saved countless lives”. This may well be true, but where is the evidence? Indeed, what would count as evidence?

NATO Watch director, Dr Ian Davis said, “NATO‘s midwifery of Libya‘s liberation from dictatorship raised many complex issues before and during the intervention. Before formally closing the operation, NATO needs to identify and articulate the hard lessons of the intervention with candour and objectivity”.

There is no shortage of questions for a Libyan inquiry to consider. For example:

· What motivated the campaign and what was the impact of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 and International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments against Gaddafi?

· Was there any way for the intervention to be calibrated to serve diplomacy between the insurgents and Gaddafi, or were the goals really aimed at regime change? And now that regime change has taken place, what are the social and political consequences?

· What are the ramifications of the fact that Gaddafi had given up his weapons of mass destruction in exchange for regime recognition, but was nevertheless confronted with regime change? How, for example, will NATO’s intervention in Libya be perceived by Iran and other would be nuclear powers?

· How might the techniques to lessen civilian casualties in Libya be applied in other theatres and how could NATO improve its investigation and monitoring of alleged civilian casualties?

· Now that the operation is almost over, how will NATO protect civilians in the post-conflict Libya given reports of widespread reprisals and prisoner abuse?

· How many people (not just civilians) did NATO operations kill? (Ministry of Defence data describes innumerable attacks on diverse targets but never with any figures for killed and injured even though bomb damage assessment using drones etc, would have provided copious information. And if there were many deaths due to the actions of NATO, this could be a source of bitterness and radicalisation in the future).

· How much did the intervention cost? And who paid for it?

· What were the details of Special Forces involvement and how do these square with “no troops on the ground” as per UNSCR 1973?

· What was done to prevent the haemorrhaging and proliferation of weapons from Libyan arms stockpiles?

· How useful a template is Libya for future Responsibility to Protect (R2P) missions? Has the mission provided any deterrent effect?

· What are the main lessons for NATO from the Libya campaign in terms of future force development strategies and the ongoing Defence and Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR)?

“R2P has now assumed a prominent place among NATO’s new missions” Davis added. “The Alliance needs to develop coherent approaches to the preparation, implementation and operational aspects of such actions”.

Lessons will only truly be learned when NATO incorporates them into its planning, doctrine, tactics, and training—a process which can take some time. Therefore, NATO should also consider establishing an R2P Committee, not only to incorporate lessons learned from Operation Unified Protector, but to analyse potential future threats of genocide and mass atrocities; develop military guidance on genocide prevention and response; and incorporate guidelines into Alliance doctrine and training (through, for example, a genocide prevention standardization agreement).

“Libya was a mission that occurred under unique circumstances”, noted Davis. “Future NATO operations under different circumstances will likely produce different results. Common sense suggests that the lessons offered here should be balanced against changing mission requirements and conditions. Future missions, however, are likely to contain enough parallels that the lessons learned in Libya warrant close attention”.

www.natowatch.org/node/565

NATO considers options for a post-Gaddafi role in Libya

August 25, 2011

Lead role ceded to UN Contact Group

NATO planners are drawing up options for a possible alliance role in Libya after the civil war ends, officials said yesterday (Slobodan Lekic, Associated Press, 24 August).

NATO’s governing body — the North Atlantic Council — has told its military staff to come up with ways to support a future UN mission to stabilize the country.

“The council provided the NATO military authorities with a set of political guidelines for a possible future NATO supporting role in Libya … in support of wider international efforts,” NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu said.

Options are expected to be presented to the alliance’s political leadership within the next week. These might include air and sea deliveries of humanitarian aid as well as setting up training programmes for Libyan security personnel. The alliance asserts that it has unique know-how in the reform of armed forces from autocratic nations, based on its work with East European military and police forces after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. However, NATO’s record of supporting security sector reform in the Middle East and North Africa is less impressive. Other assistance to the UN mission could consist of logistical support, or reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned drones to provide surveillance over Libya.

Lungescu said the North Atlantic Council had agreed that any possible future supporting role for NATO must “satisfy the criteria of a demonstrable need, a sound legal basis and wide regional support”. Another condition was that NATO would not have any “sustained” troop presence on the ground in Libya. This hints at a slight softening of NATO’s earlier “no troops on the ground” mantra, which Lungescu herself reiterated in the NATO press briefing only the day before.

The relatively successful post-conflict scenarios in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor suggest an early deployment of international peacekeepers will be required in Libya. But if NATO refuses to participate in a peacekeeping force (as looks likely at the moment), this will place an increased burden on the already overstretched UN peacekeeping framework. One option might be for a combined EU/AU peacekeeping force, although this may take some time to assemble.

At that earlier press briefing the NATO spokeswoman also said, for the Gaddafi regime “the end is near. And events are moving fast. What’s clear to everybody is that Gaddafi is history. And the sooner he realizes it, the better. The Libyan people should be spared more suffering and more bloodshed. The remnants of the regime are desperate, they may be trying to fight back here and there, but they are fighting a losing battle”.

Lungescu stressed the need to sustain the mission to protect civilians citing the launch of another Scud-type missile against Misrata. How Gaddafi managed to retain some of his Scud missiles is itself an interesting story (discussed here), while others, including the UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague, warn that desperate members of the collapsing regime could yet try to unleash Libya’s stocks of chemical weapons.

NATO’s operational activities over the past five months in Libya were summed up by Longescu as having “steadily degraded a war machine, built up over more than 40 years. Today, we’ll past the milestone of 20,000 sorties flown. We have damaged or destroyed almost 5,000 legitimate military targets, including over 800 tanks and artillery pieces. And we have done so with unprecedented precision and as much care as possible to minimize the risk to civilians”.  But the campaign has exposed deep splits within the alliance, with only eight of the 28 member states taking part in the military action.

In particular, the issue of civilian casualties from NATO air strikes continues to raise concerns, with one US congressman calling for NATO’s top commanders to be held accountable through the International Criminal Court for all civilian deaths resulting from the bombing. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch issued statements calling on all sides to protect civilians amidst the fighting in Tripoli, while UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon called for a smooth transition and gave assurances that the UN would assist in post conflict planning including security and rule of law, social-economic, human rights and transitional justice.

NATO officials say the campaign is unlikely to be seen as a template for further intervention in the Middle East. The Libyan campaign had UN backing, giving it a legitimacy that is unlikely to be bestowed too readily on other humanitarian or ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) interventions. In part this is because NATO is widely seen as having exceeded the UN mandate by taking sides in a civil war. In addition to using its air power in aid of the rebels cause, NATO officials now concede that special forces teams from Qatar, France, Britain and some east European states, as well as US intelligence assets, provided critical assistance in an undercover campaign operating separately from the NATO command structure.

Further reading:

After Libya, the question: To protect or depose?  Philippe Bolopion, Los Angeles Times, 25 August 

Why Libya sceptics were proved badly wrong, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Financial Times, 24 August

We have proved in Libya that intervention can still work, David Owen, Daily Telegraph, 23 August

Don’t Call It A Comeback- Four reasons why Libya doesn’t equal success for NATO, Kurt Volker, ForeignPolicy.com, 23 August

Foreign policy: intervention after Libya, The Guardian – editorial, 23 August

A Solution From Hell – The perils of humanitarian intervention, the editors of n+1, Slate, 17 August

Libya and the State of Intervention, Tim Dunne, R2P Ideas in brief: Vol. 1 No. 1, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, August 2011

Libya, Syria, and the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), ICRtoP Blog Post, 9 August

The Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention, Walden Bello, Foreign Policy in Focus, 9 August

NATO Watch Briefing Paper No.19

27 June 2011

Promoting a more transparent and accountable NATO

NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue in the wake of the Arab Spring:

partnership for peace or succour for despots?

By Martin A. Smith and Ian Davis

Download the Briefing Paper here: http://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/NATO_Watch_Briefing_Paper_No.19.pdf

Key Points:

NATO has been engaged in the Middle East and North Africa for over 16 years through a little known partnership programme known as the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the more recent Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)

NATO recently announced an extension in its MD/ICI cooperation “toolbox” from around 700 to more than 1600 “activities”. These activities range from ordinary military contact to exchanges of information on maritime security and counter-terrorism, access to educational programmes provided by Alliance institutions, and joint crisis management exercises. However, while 2008-09 versions of the toolbox were published for the first time in June 2010, what each country takes from it remains secret.

The lack of transparency makes it very difficult to evaluate the impact of these security relationships on the Arab Spring.

In the early years, the dialogue consisted mainly of low-key bilateral meetings at NATO headquarters between officials and representatives from Mediterranean states. A lack of funding from the NATO side, lack of more substantial military input to the dialogue from both sides, and a continuing sense that the process lacked overall direction and a clear sense of purpose were key constraints.

The ‘complementary’ ICI was created in 2004, at the suggestion of the United States, to involve Middle Eastern states in future NATO missions, although both the MD and ICI have remained relatively marginal processes in internal NATO debates, as well as in terms of actual co-operative activity.

The new Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon in November 2010 acknowledged the importance of partnerships in general and indicated that a fresh impetus would be given to the MD/ICI.

Conclusions:

The MD/ICI throughout its relatively short history has predominantly focused on the interests and security agendas of the Alliance, rather than those of the partner states. The human security concerns of the people in the region were of even lower order of priority. Hence, the events taking place in the Middle East are happening not because of NATO policy but despite it.

Divisions within NATO continue to hamper a consensual and constructive response to the Arab Spring.

There is very little information in the public domain on the extent of NATO’s cooperation with individual countries under the MD and ICI initiatives. Any future NATO security sector reform assistance in the region should be subject to proper scrutiny, oversight and independent evaluation.

NATO’s renewed policy of partnership will only appear reliable to the ‘Arab street’ if it is consistent, sustained and views reform as the key issue on the agenda

Libya: NATO must stick to the R2P script

Dr. Ian Davis – director of NATO Watch – March 31, 2011

The UN-authorised intervention in Libya has thrown up complex ethical issues of paramount importance, as well as misgivings about NATO assuming command of the military dimension. It is an intervention that has both an overt face and a hidden face, and behind every rationalization seemingly another rationalization, often of quite a different order than the declared protection of Libyan civilians.

What started out as an action that observed the majority of the norms of international law and multilateral consultation is now in danger of reverting to type. The heavy-handed application of unilateral US, French and British muscle and talk of regime change, arming the rebels and even assassinating Gaddafi risks breaking the fragile international consensus and many of the political gains secured through UNSC resolution 1973 – including the historic embrace of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principles agreed in 2005.

With NATO assuming command of all military operations, the Alliance must stick to the letter of the UN resolution and R2P principles. Five crucial steps are required:

1. The use of “all necessary measures” to protect civilian areas from attack by Libyan government forces should only continue as long as the attacks on civilians persist or are threatened
2. Diplomatic efforts should be stepped up to achieve an early unconditional ceasefire and then work towards a lasting political settlement
3. NATO should abide by clear and transparent rules of engagement
4. Parliaments in member states should hold their governments accountable for NATO actions in Libya
5. Open and careful monitoring of civilian casualties

There was undoubtedly a strong anti-war case for staying out of Libya, but there was, and still is, a stronger pro-peace case for limited military intervention based upon a responsibility to protect civilians. But the limits of the Libyan intervention need to be clearly articulated and followed to the letter.

Download the full atricle here.

NATO Watch Briefing Paper No.18

8 March 2011

Promoting a more transparent and accountable NATO

NATO starts around-the-clock surveillance of Libya…..

….but allies remain divided over no-fly zone plan

NATO leaders are divided on plans to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya. The NATO Secretary General has ruled out a NATO-enforced no-fly zone in the absence of a UN mandate. Should NATO be doing more than issuing press releases? Or would it be better to leave the Libyans to win their battle with the Gaddafi regime on their own? This briefing examines the options and pitfalls for NATO military intervention in Libya.

Download the Briefing Paper here: http://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/NATO_Watch_Briefing_Paper_No.18.pdf

Urgent questions NATO should be asking before considering any military intervention:

What is the legitimacy and basis for supporting a group of rebels in the eastern part of Libya as the de facto ‘new Libya’?

If this is a civil war, what separates the two sides? Is it simply Gaddafi or do identity, geography and/or ideology come into it too?

What degree of popular support does Gaddafi have in Libya?

Does NATO have sufficient intelligence to mount an effective military intervention?

What would an ‘effective intervention’ seek to deliver?

What are the potential ‘blowbacks’ from intervention, including the likely impact on what has been until now a predominantly organic, home-grown democratic movement across the region?

What are the potential consequences for Libyan citizens and the future of the R2P doctrine by non-intervention?

To what extent should other actors and/or non-military instruments be applied first or in parallel with military intervention?

What should be the triggers for military intervention and on whose authority should it be undertaken?

Would the country (and region) be better off to the extent that whatever happens is a Libyan decision (and unequivocally seen to be so), not one made in Brussels, Washington or London?

Previous NATO Watch Observatorys to read/download:
17th edition (Jan 2011)
16th edition (Dec 2010)
15th edition (Nov 2010)
14th edition (Oct 2010)
13th edition (Sep 2010)
12th edition (Aug 2010)
11th edition (Jul 2010)
10th edition (Jun 2010)
9th edition (May 2010)
8th edition (Apr 2010)
7th edition (Mar 2010)
6th edition (Feb 2010)
5th edition (Jan 2010)
4th edition (Dec 2010)
3rd edition (Nov 2009)
2nd edition (Oct 2009)
1st edition (Sep 2009)